It examines major emotion theories in philosophy and psychology and shows that they fail to illustrate that romantic love is an emotion. It considers the categories of basic emotions and emotion complexes, and demonstrates they too come short in accounting for romantic love. It assesse… Read more What kind of mental phenomenon is romantic love? It assesses the roles of culture and evolution in shaping the romantic love phenomenon and evaluates the ways in which the norms of rationality that are applied to standard emotions fail to apply to love.
It considers the category of sentiments and argue that despite coming close, it does not adequately capture the nature of romantic love. Finally, the chapter makes a case for love being best characterized as a syndrome. Book ReviewsRichard Wollheim,. On the Emotions. New Haven, Conn. Value Theory.
Classical empiricists are notorious for claiming that cognition is perceptually based. This dissertation reassesses that claim against the background of contemporary cognitive science. More specifically, it develops a broadly empiricist theory of concepts and argues that this theory outperforms other theories.
In the first chapter, I lay down seven desiderata. An adequate theory of concepts should lend itself to an explanation of expressive scope, intentionality, cognitive content, acquisition, … Read more Classical empiricists are notorious for claiming that cognition is perceptually based.
An adequate theory of concepts should lend itself to an explanation of expressive scope, intentionality, cognitive content, acquisition, categorization, compositionality, and publicity. I argue that none of the leading theories that have been developed by philosophers and psychologists can satisfy all of these desiderata.
A proxytype is a collection of stored, high-level perceptual representations, which represent features typically exhibited by members of the category it designates.
I argue that proxytypes lend themselves to an economical account of concept acquisition by bootscrapping on independently motivated theories of perception, and I provide an account of categorization by exploiting the kinship between proxytypes and prototypes. The third chapter raises three objections to proxytype theory, involving three of the remaining desiderata: expressive scope, publicity, and compositionality.
The final chapter completes my defense of proxytype theory, by taking on the last two desiderata. It provides a naturalistic account of intentionality and cognitive content inspired by Locke's distinction between real and nominal essences. The real content of a proxytype is the property of belonging to some unique kind, and the nominal content is a set of properties typically exhibited by members of that kind. I contrast my account of nominal content with three theories of narrow content and conclude that it has all of their merits and none of their flaws.
Intentionality Perception and Thought. All consciousness is perceptual In Brian P. Cohen eds. Cambridge, Mass. Metascience 12 3 : Concepts Perception-Based Theories of Concepts. Philosophy Compass 4 6 : The idea that natural languages shape the way we think in different ways was popularized by Benjamin Whorf, but then fell out of favor for lack of empirical support.
But now, a new wave of research has been shifting the tide back toward linguistic relativity. The recent research can be interpreted in different ways, some trivial, some implausibly radical, and some both plausible and interesting. We introduce two theses that would have important implications if true: Habitual Whorfianism and Onto… Read more The idea that natural languages shape the way we think in different ways was popularized by Benjamin Whorf, but then fell out of favor for lack of empirical support.
We introduce two theses that would have important implications if true: Habitual Whorfianism and Ontological Whorfianism. We argue that these offer the most promising interpretations of the emerging evidence. Sound morality: Irritating and icky noises amplify judgments in divergent moral domains with Angelika Seidel. Cognition 1 : Theoretical models and correlational research suggest that anger and disgust play different roles in moral judgment.
Anger is theorized to underlie reactions to crimes against persons, such as battery and unfairness, and disgust is theorized to underlie reactions to crimes against nature, such as sexual transgressions and cannibalism.
To date, however, it has not been shown that induction of these two emotions has divergent effects. In this experiment we show divergent effects of anger and disgu… Read more Theoretical models and correlational research suggest that anger and disgust play different roles in moral judgment.
In this experiment we show divergent effects of anger and disgust. We use sounds to elicit anger and disgust, and participants are then asked to consider moral vignettes.
As compared to disgust and control condition, anger increases severity of judgments about crimes against persons, and disgust increases severity of judgments about crimes against nature, but not conversely. Psychology of Ethics Moral Judgment, Misc. Why Do Porn Films Suck? Philosophy of Neuroscience. When is Film Art? Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 : Cinema The Art of Film.
When is perception conscious? In Bence Nanay ed. Once upon a time, people thought that all perception was conscious. Indeed, it was widely believed that all mental states are conscious, so the problem of explaining consciousness collapses into the problem of explaining mentality.
But things have changed. Most people now believe that a lot goes on unconsciously. Indeed, some people believe that mental states that are not perceptual in nature are never conscious. Less controversial is the claim that perceptual sta… Read more Once upon a time, people thought that all perception was conscious.
Less controversial is the claim that perceptual states are conscious some of the time, but not all of the time. This raises a question. To me poetry is unequivocally an art, literary novels are borderline cases and vary, and ordinary works of fiction are not. I think this ranking could be explained by saying that poetry and very literary works aspire to or tend do induce wonder to a greater degree.
We are blown away by great writing, and great writers choose turns of phrase and other stylistic elements that are in some sense perplexing. Why was that word used there? Also, we find perplexing narrative devices: what is going on here. The more a writer strays from this, the weaker my intuition becomes that the writer is an artist. Just a thought. I wouldn't want to push this too far.
I do think modern systems of the arts are in part conventional, but those conventions can influence what reactions people have to works. On Kivy, it's partially terminological. I define aesthetic in terms of wonder, but but that's really fiat. The term is presumably polysemous and could be precisified in other ways.
So, I'm not sure where to come down. I do think the question you raise about whether there is overlap in our responses to art and literature will be very fruitful for me to dwell on some more.
Bill, thanks for the delightful and quotable riches here! As someone who makes art, does philosophy of art, and also cognitive science, I always find your insights on these topics illuminating, and you've given me a lot to think about.
You want to find a way to put wonder into the hands of the institutionalizes, and I think your proposal would work. I want to suggest against this, however, that instutitionalists got to the scene too late. Wonder has been part of art-making long before there were institutions dedicated to art, and it is part of art-making across a range of cultures. I think the art world is, to this extent, beholden to wonder, rather than the other way around. This can be seen in the case of the anti-aesthetic artists you mention.
Paxton's act was ceremonial and he turned a practical activity into something lofty, Morris's minimalism is spiritual and poetic, Warhol is an alchemist transfiguring the commonplace, likewise for Johns and Rauschenberg. For em wonder is not restricted to being pleasant to look at. It is more linked to special-making and mystification. Political art may be a harder case for me. And this brings me the Berlyne and Wundt. I don't want pleasingness or reduction of uncertainty to be components of wonder.
I think wondrous things are not necessarily pleasant, though they are compelling. Puzzling is probably a bad construct for me to use, since it implies resolution, and I don't think wonder orients people towards solving a puzzle.
The reverence in wonder ensures that we see wondrous things as greater than ourselves. Lobsters and sunsets don't have this enduring mystery. I think sunsets might, if we can get over the cliche, but they are not works, hence not artworks. It means a lot to me that you wrote. Thanks for that. Also, really fantastic comments. You give me a great opportunity to think more about performance, which I have woefully neglected here. I have a lot to learn from you on this. I think your insights about downtown dance are spot on.
With traditional ballet, one gets wonder on the cheap: the use of formalized movements and opposed to ordinary movements in perplexing and some choreography is bewildering , the physical talent is worthy of reference, and the elegance engages our senses. Dance is also tied to ritual in ways that can make a performance take on otherworldly qualities, which are conducive to wonder. WIth some downtown dance, many of these standard techniques are abandoned though much modern dance retains them.
What does one do with a performance that involves a person waling across a room in an ordinary way, in the context of a dance performance. I think you've already gone a long way towards answering this question. But imagine an extreme case where that's all there is to the performance.
Some ordinary movements in an ordinary context. Here too, there might be room for wonder. We ask, why are these people doing this and calling it a performance? We state waiting to see something special. Sensory engagement. We applaud the choreography for the creativity of challenging limits of dance.
SO I think we can get wonder to work in even an extreme case. But I want the account to be falsifiable, so it is important to me that dance be looked at with much more care. I must say, however, that over the years, I have grown much more skeptical about theories of art, theories of artistic interpretation, and theories of artistic value.
Indeed, I really wonder, along with Susan Sontag, H. Mencken, and others, whether theorizing about art really does anyone any good at all.
Daniel, might I ask at which end lies the source of your skepticism about philosophy of art or at least its capacity to do anyone any good? I can give a short answer, and then, depending on whether I've got your question right, I could go more in depth. I agree with Sibley that aesthetic properties are entirely particular in character, which means that no philosophical account can really be given of them either.
Again, not much room for philosophy. Contrary to my own earlier views, I no longer believe that there are any rules, canons, or even loosely associated characteristics that could provide us with an account of artistic value. These are the dimensions of life that philosophy has never had much of interest to say about and for which its tools—rational investigation, generalization, and analysis—have never been well suited.
Funny, I think that artist's statements are completely useless. I am not sure if it does though. Also, maybe not all people can experience the same in front of the same piece of art. A valid question would be why not all works of art by great masters provide us with the same amount of perplexity? It seems that different people respond to different pieces of artworks.
I am not so sure I understand either what Jesse really means, but I have also experienced amazement in front of a piece of art that I greatly appreciated.
Steff Rocknak: I find your observations quite interesting. The wonder that can arise toward the technicality of an extraordinary piece of art and the wonder that arises from a piece of art that lacks technicality or the technical aspect is less important? But what is important is what they both need to be extraordinary as their appearance to make us wonder. As not being boring, ordinary, known.
I would rather think that than the opposite. Is it somehow clear that once you experience wonder you also understand the artwork that you see? I think the role of the artist is very important. Never should be underestimated this aspect. They are not complete idiots that make non-artists wonder, aren't they? You called it art though, so it must pass some criteria to be considered art, no? I am very interested in the role played by beauty in art.
I think it is necessary or it might just be plain perfect to have sane reasons to eliminate it. You also make a distinction between beauty and pretty. A better understanding of what beauty means would be useful. Uncertainty is not something that wonder implies. Neither pleasingness. Wonder does not orient people toward solving a puzzle. It might be mysterious though? But I do not want to know more as being content with what I am seeing? To see something greater than ourselves?
I think you see it again and again and again until you can get enough of it. The wonder attitude toward that artwork might end when you get bored with the artwork. Could you be puzzled in that moment by the fact that you were so wondrously attracted by that artwork? Are you less rational when you are in a wonder state of art appreciation?
If you do not have this propensity of wondering in front of an artwork, will you be less capable of appreciating an artwork at its true value? In general. In particular, no one can have a wonder appreciation toward all artworks, assuming they are produced by great artists.
Only toward some of them. Also an artwork is produced by an artist, not by anyone or by nature. You also said that lots of natural things and artificial things can also produce wonder. I am not sure what is the difference between an artificial thing and an artwork. Is it the same wonder as when viewing an artwork? I do not think it makes sense or that it is possible.
I am also curious to know if an artist can lie in an artwork. Or if it is possible for them to lie in artworks. You need a reason for this, but is this all?
I do not know, it is just an idea. They can hide, that is certain, but it is not the same. You do not want to reveal everything because people get bored with your artwork and move away to something else.
But it is not just that the viewer feels wonder in front of the artist's artwork, the artist himself can feel wonder. That they were onto something. That in order to create amazing things, you have to believe in amazing things and cultivate that.
I wonder how productive is this attitude among artists. Will they all become capable of creating great artworks because of cultivating this sort of attitude? Probably not. You mentioned that you are not a fan of Delacroix. I actually liked Delacroix very much, although his influence from Rubens is so obvious. But I did not know that straight away.
Still a great painter. My view regarding Romanticism is not settled, I am strongly against it and also in favor for it. Just the idea of doing it all, of innovation to your wildest imagination is a seductive idea for anyone. You can not resist it. Also a bit childish and without strong rational foundations? But we all like to be this way, just that it is not all that possible.
Chopin, for instance, seems very romantic when you first listen. Too sweet to bear. But after listening him, you realize that there is nothing romantic about his music. Quite the opposite. Or so it seemed to me. I also like George Sand. Her style is not pretentious, and comes natural. I like the way she depicts life from the countryside, like she actually understood it. Incredibly interesting and indepth article, and some fascinating imagery, I never knew there was an inflatable poo installation!
Why do you think expertize about artistic conventions would diminish reliance on wonder when we engage with the piece? I would think the opposite to be true. I would also predict that greater artistic skill would increase wonder during the production process. Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. Notify me of follow-up comments by email. Notify me of new posts by email. Anish Kapoor, Leviathan. Arshilel Gorky, Agony. Paul McCarthy, Inflatable Poo.
A museum-goer views a work by Anselm Kiefer in Berlin. The Guggenheim in Bilbao. A work from the Museum of Bad Art. Yoko Ono, examples from Grapefruit. Marcel Duchamp, Fountain. The Worm Museum, a Cabinet of Curiosity. Eva Hesse, Right After. Dwight Furrow August 5, at pm.
Christy Mag Uidhir August 6, at am. Jesse Prinz August 6, at am. Anonymous August 6, at pm. Steff Rocknak August 6, at pm. Stephen Davies - unknown. Laurie Shrage - - Hypatia 5 2 - Ideas About Art. Kathleen Kadon Desmond - - Wiley-Blackwell. Cardullo - - Journal of Aesthetic Education 45 2 Added to PP index Total views 49, of 2,, Recent downloads 6 months 3 , of 2,, How can I increase my downloads?
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